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K D Ewing, Joan Mahoney and Andrew Moretta 
 
 
‘Democracies can overdo their respect for liberty of speech  





Whatever the textbooks, lawyers and judges may say about free speech, few 
governments will tolerate for long uncomfortable truths being told to expose lies and 
deception.   Restrictions on speech come in multiple forms, whether prior restraints to 
prevent things being said, or penalties after the event to punish for things having been 
said.   These restrictions may relate to speech of different kinds, our tolerance of 
restraint depending to a large extent on the subject-matter:   in liberal societies 
political speech is generally thought to be worthy of the highest protection.   But apart 
from traditional questions of form and substance are the less traditional questions of 
method.   By what means does the State seek to restrain or punish those who speak 
out of line?   
 
The use of legislative and judicial powers respectively is of course the method of 
restraint most familiar to lawyers, but they are not the exclusive means by which the 
State seeks to silence its critics.  Although there are significant statutory and common 
law restraints on freedom of expression, in the case of political speech it may 
nevertheless not be possible easily to secure the necessary legislative or judicial 
approval for the imposition of additional limits.   Also important but insufficiently 
analysed is thus the administrative power of the State, by which those clothed with 
legal authority use that authority to restrict speech for partisan ends.   One of the most 
important examples of the abuse of such power is provided by the Korean War, which 
is quickly losing its sobriquet as the ‘forgotten war’.2.    
 
The Korean hostilities started on 25 June 1950 when the Peoples’ Army (equipped by 
the Soviet Union and supported by China) crossed the 38th parallel.   The United 
Kingdom sent 90,000 troops as part of an American led United Nations peace-keeping 
force, despatched under the authority of UN Security Resolution 84, ostensibly to 
restore peace and stability to Korea.3   This was a brutal conflict in which over five 
million civilians and soldiers from several countries perished, including an estimated 
20% of the North Korean population, before an armistice was signed on 27 July 1953.   
Britain’s involvement – authorised by Attlee and continued by Churchill – led to 
some 1,000 British military personnel being killed, with many more wounded or 
imprisoned in what were extremely harsh conditions. 
                                                 
1 TNA, PREM 8/1525 (Emergency Powers, Minute by Attorney General, 25 July 1950). 
2 BBC News, 20 April 2001 (‘Britain’s Forgotten War’). 
3 The leading and definitive work is B Cumings The Korean War: A History (2010).   For a different 
account, see M Hastings, The Korean War (2012).    
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It has been argued forcefully that in order to understand the situation in Korea today, 
it is necessary to understand what happened in the 1950s.4   The atrocities committed 
by the US-led UN forces are beyond dispute, and can hardly be a matter of surprise 
given the calculated barbarism only five years earlier, as anyone who has visited the 
Hiroshima Peace Park and Museum will be only too well aware.5   Almost as 
shameful as the atrocities in Korea were the extreme steps taken to silence and 
eventually to punish those who sought to expose them.  In this article we tell the story 
of three of the most prominent critics:   a journalist (Alan Winnington), a women’s 
movement activist (Monica Felton), and a solicitor (Jack Gaster).   Both Winnington 
and Gaster were Communists, but Felton was a member of the Labour Party.6   
 
A superficial examination of the record might suggest that the Attlee government and 
Churchill’s thereafter responded to provocation with commendable restraint:   no one 
was prosecuted for things said or written about the Korean War, despite strong 
political pressure to do so.  In this paper, however, we consider how in the absence of 
carefully tailored and proportionate legislation, the continuing relevance of the 
Korean War lies not only in the contemporary resumption of provocative behaviour:   
on the contrary, the conduct of government during the war also teaches that 
prosecution is but one of the ways by which law can be deployed.  In this case it was 
the law of treason that was the weapon of intimidation and punishment, with threats 
of increasing gravity being made under both Labour and Conservative governments. 
 
 
II ALAN WINNINGTON …. 
 
Alan Winnington was a member of the British Communist party, based in China.  He 
had travelled there in 1948 at the request of Harry Pollitt – the General Secretary of 
the Communist Party of Great Britain - to provide support to the Communist Party of 
China.   Being based in China during the Korean War, Winnington was able to 
provide an invaluable and unrivalled account of the war as seen from North Korea.   
Soon after the outbreak of hostilities, Winnington went to Korea, providing for the 
Daily Worker a different account from that ‘churned out by radio and press (Daily 
Herald and Daily Mail alike)’, the truth being ‘so carefully hidden and distorted by 
the millionaire press’.   A long despatch from Winnington was published separately as 
a pamphlet in September 1950,7 this providing detail that was no doubt unwelcome in 
London and Washington, though scarcely detail of a kind that would not be provided 
by a conscientious war reporter doing his job properly.    
 
Reminding his readers of the bombing of Coventry, Winnington reported much worse 
– not only of large-scale destruction but of the gratuitous and deliberate slaughter of 
the innocent: 
                                                 
4 B Cumings, ‘Americans once carpet-bombed North Korea.  It’s time to remember that past’, The 
Guardian, 13 August 2017. 
5 ‘Calculated’ in the sense that Hiroshima (like Nagasaki) was chosen as an atomic bomb site because 
of the density of its population, thereby to increase casualties. 
6 Unlike the United States and a number of other countries, the United Kingdom did not ban the 
Communist Party, which indeed had two MPs elected in 1945.   In the 1940s, defence of the realm 
regulations were used by the war-time Coalition briefly to suppress the Daily Worker, the Communist 
Party’s newspaper.  See W Rust, The Story of the Daily Worker (2010 ed).   
7 A Winnington. I Saw the Truth in Korea (1950). 
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It takes pure Nazi mentality to kill a woman and child in cold blood, using for 
the purpose a few thousand horse-power and a fire-power of over 100 machine 
gun bullets per second.   I have seen this happen.  She was the only person on 
that stretch of road because everyone else had dropped into ditches when the 
plane was heard.   It was not a mistake by the pilot, because in Korea, with 
good eyes, you can distinguish a woman from a mile away or more.  
Typically, this one was carrying a baby strapped to her back and a big bundle 
on her head, and was wearing a long billowing white skirt.   The pilot knew he 
was blasting a woman and child but he just casually opened up his guns and 
went on’.8 
 
Although the conduct reported is utterly inexcusable, this is reporting of a kind with 
which we have become very familiar since 1950.  But Winnington was also to report 
about the slaughter of thousands of political prisoners and the mass graves in which 
they were buried: 
 
In the middle you can walk safely, though your shoes may roll on American 
cartridge shells, but at the side you must be careful for the rest of the valley is 
a thin crust of earth covering corpses of more than 7,000 men and women.   
One of the party with me stepped through nearly to his hip in rotting human 
tissue.  Every few feet there is a fissure in the topsoil through which you can 
see into a gradually sinking mass of flesh and bone.   The smell is something 
tangible that seeps into your throat.   For days after I could taste the smell.   
All along the great death pits, waxy dead hands and feet, knees, elbows, 
twisted faces and heads burst open by bullets, sticking through the soil.9 
 
And so it goes on.10   It is unlikely that one side only was responsible for the brutality 
and barbarity, in a war that ‘bore all the hallmarks of the Nazi blitzkrieg, with both 
sides staging massive, fast-moving offensives which swept aside the opposition’.11   It 
is also unlikely possible that Winnington’s account was not exaggerated, as a risk the 
Cabinet Secretary appeared privately to acknowledge raise when urging caution about 
legislating to punish reports of this kind.12   This nevertheless did not protect 
Winnington from allegations of treason by those embarrassed by his reports.   To this 
end, on 18 September 1950 the Attorney General introduced a discussion in Cabinet 
about the application of the law of treason to the events in Korea, in advance of a 
parliamentary question to which he was to respond later that day.13   Sir Hartley 
Shawcross KC informed those present that the law of treason and other English laws 
applied as if the country were at war, a view with which the Lord Chancellor (Jowitt) 
not only agreed but said should be ‘publicly stated’.14    
                                                 
8 Ibid, p 4. 
9 Ibid, p 5. 
10 According to Winnington, ‘the death pits are six feet deep and from six to twelve feet wide.  The 
biggest is 200 yards long. Two are 100 yards long and the smallest 30 yards long.  Local peasants were 
forced at the rifle point to dig them’ (ibid). 
11 BBC News, 20 April 2001 (‘Britain’s Forgotten War’). 
12 TNA, PREM 8/1525 (Overseas Operations (Security of Forces) Bill, Memorandum to Prime 
Minister, 15 November 1950).   
13 TNA, CAB 128/18/20 (18 September 1950). 
14 The Lord Chancellor in particular was in no doubt that North Korea was at war with South Korea, 
and that ‘the States which joined this conflict were also at war’.   So far as international law was 
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As a result, the Attorney General was invited to use the opportunity of a 
parliamentary written answer to say that ‘a British subject who consorted with the 
North Koreans might lay himself open to a charge of treason’.  So in response to 
Major Tufton Beamish (Tory MP for Lewes), Shawcross issued an uncompromising 
threat to Winnington and the Daily Worker: 
 
This question involves difficult problems both of international and municipal 
law to which the Government have been giving urgent consideration. 
Meanwhile, no one should be in doubt that the law of treason is applicable in 
connection with the present conflict. The activities of the only individual at 
present known to be with the North Korean Forces, as well as those of the 
newspaper he represents, are being closely watched.15    
 
The question of treason returned to Cabinet on 6 November, again following PQs to 
the Attorney General.   On this occasion, however, the Attorney returned to ask his 
colleagues whether they knew of ‘any matters, either of an international or domestic 
character, to which he ought to have regard in deciding whether or not to prosecute 
those responsible for the propaganda conducted by the Daily Worker in support of the 
Communist cause in Korea’.16  Particular attention was drawn to Winnington’s 
pamphlet, ‘which made grave allegations against the South Koreans and American 
soldiers and airmen and attacked the United Kingdom Government for their support 
of United Nations action in Korea’.    
 
Surprisingly, Shawcross ‘had little doubt that this publication gave ‘aid and comfort 
to The King's enemies’ and so constituted treason, but he was reluctant to bring 
against the author or publishers a charge of treason, for which the only penalty was 
death’.17  Unsurprisingly, that reluctance appears to have been widely shared: 
 
In discussion it was pointed out that other newspapers and periodicals had 
published information about alleged atrocities by South Koreans, and there 
was little doubt that the Koreans on both sides had conducted the war in a 
barbarous fashion. It would, therefore, be said that the author and publishers of 
this pamphlet were being prosecuted because of its political bias. There was 
also a risk that a jury, knowing that the penalty was death, would refuse to 
convict.18 
The Attorney General was invited to ‘take note of the views expressed in the 
Cabinet's discussion on the political and other objections to the institution of 
proceedings for treason in respect of Daily Worker propaganda regarding the Korean 
                                                 
concerned, there was some doubt on the ground that some international lawyers were said to believe 
that the Korean operation ‘represented something in the nature of police action’, which was how it had 
been represented by both US President Truman and the Prime Minister of Canada:  ibid.   However, the 
more sober DPP appeared to disagree.  See below, p ***. 
15 HC Debs, 19 September 1950, col 203 WA. 




campaign’.19    
The Cabinet thus appeared to support Shawcross’ position of using treason as an 
instrument of intimidation in the full knowledge that there was no immediate 
intention to prosecute (though that might change).   In doing so, it is striking that there 
was no reference in the Cabinet minute to the need to respect free speech, ministers 
influenced it seems only by the same practical considerations that had moved 
Shawcross.   One reason why there might not be a prosecution is because - as the DPP 
was later to reveal – all the ingredients necessary for a treason charge were not 
present, Shawcross risking accusations of mendacity as well as naked political 
calculation in his parliamentary threat to Winnington and the Daily Worker.20   But as 
the quotation with which this article begins clearly reveals, the Attorney General was 
no defender of free speech, these quoted remarks expressed in support of proposals 
for limits and restrictions by the introduction of war time restraints into peace-time 
conditions.21  
 
III MONICA FELTON  
In 1951 attention turned to Mrs Monica Felton, the Chairman of the Stevenage 
Development Corporation, who took leave of absence from her employment, and in a 
private capacity left England for Korea on 29 April.  On the day she left, Mrs Felton 
wrote to John Freeman, Labour MP for Watford, the latter admitting to having ‘some 
very slight acquaintance with this lady for a number of years’.22   Freeman explained 
that Mrs Felton had told him that  
 
A fact finding delegation of one each from many countries, including Sweden, 
Denmark, Norway, France, Canada, the USA, and the USSR, is about to go to 
Korea to investigate conditions. I have been asked to go from this country, and 
have agreed to do so’.23  
 
In the same letter, Mrs Felton explained 
 
Although the delegation is sponsored by the Women's Democratic Federation 
it will include many women who, like myself, have no connection with that 
organisation but who believe that an objective report on the facts would be of 
real value to the people of the countries from which they come.24  
                                                 
19 Ibid.  Even if a conviction was obtained, this would be regarded as a Government prosecution and it 
might be thought anomalous that the Home Secretary should thereafter advise The King to commute 
the only sentence which the court could impose 
20 Shawcross nevertheless expressed the view three times that the Treason Act applied to the Korean 
conflict, according to Sir Reginald Manningham-Buller when he was Attorney General:   H C Debs, 7 
March 1955, col 33. 
21 This was a not uncommon practice, with first world war defence of the realm powers made 
permanent in the Official Secrets Act 1920. 
22 HC Debs, 14 June 1951, col 2680. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Ibid.   Felton had asked Freeman if he would see her personally so that she could tell him about her 
experiences.   It seems that he had written to her to say that he would be pleased to see her on her 
return, without realizing the nature of her visit (thinking that she was going to South Korea rather than 
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Mrs Felton wrote in similar terms to a number of others, including George Lindgren, 
a junior minister for town and country planning.25    An account of the trip is to be 
found in That’s Why I Went, in which Felton reveals that she was greatly moved by 
what she saw in Sinyju and Pyong-Yang in particular.26   A flavour of her experience 
is to be found in a recording made for Moscow Radio on the way home, the recording 
then broadcast on 10 June 1951.    Felton does not give an account of the contents of 
the broadcast in That’s Why I Went, though she claims that she wrote the script while 
‘weighing every word’.27   Extracts were read out in the House of Commons a few 
days later by hostile Tory MPs, indicating that Felton spoke of the ‘atrocities 
committed in the areas which had been occupied by the United States, British and 
Syngman Rhee forces’. ‘Again and again’, she continued 
 
we were told of whole families, men, women and children, who had been 
imprisoned for days without food or water and who had then been shot, burnt 
to death and even, on very many occasions, buried alive. The stories were told 
us again and again by eye-witnesses, by people who had themselves suffered 
many of the tortures they described or who had lost their own relatives.28 
 
The Moscow recording was broadcast three days after Mrs Felton’s return on 7 June, 
from which point events moved very quickly.  On 8 June, she held a press conference 
in Fleet Street.  Although attended by only a ‘handful of press representatives’,29  on 
the following day (9 June) her ‘lurid’ account was fully covered by newspapers,30 
from the Daily Mail to the Daily Worker.   The next day was a Sunday (the day of the 
Moscow broadcast), but on Monday 11 June, she received two letters from Hugh 
Dalton, the Minister for Town and Country Planning.   One instructed her not to 
attend the next board meeting of the Stevenage Development Corporation, and the 
other asked for an explanation for her absence.   Felton replied to the latter instantly, 
and on the following day, 12 June, she was sacked, the minister making clear that the 
reason for her dismissal was her failure to attend the Public Accounts Committee on 7 
June.31   Her dismissal was announced by Dalton to the House of Commons on 13 
June, and widely discussed in the press immediately thereafter. 
                                                 
North Korea).  He was now embarrassed at having written in ‘cordial terms’ and that of course he 
would be pleased to see her on her return (ibid, col 2681). 
25 LSE, Hugh Dalton Papers, 2/9/24 (Letter from Monica Felton to Charles Lindgren MP, 29 April 
1951). 
26 M Felton, That’s Why I Went (1953), said to be a ‘gushing little book about her uplifting experience’:  
M Hastings, The Korean War, above, p ***.   An earlier account was provided in a pamphlet, M 
Felton, What I Saw in Korea [nd]. 
27 Felton, ibid, p 166.  The text is available at Tass Agency, Soviet Monitor No 12,599, 11 June 1951:  
Labour Party/GS/PROS/1-85.   Labour Party Files are stored at the Peoples’ History Museum, 
Manchester.    
28 HC Debs, 14 June 1950, col 2677.  This is not quite an accurate quotation from the Tass report, 
above. 
29 Daily Mail, 9 June 1950. 
30 Manchester Guardian, 14 June 1951.   Internal Labour Party correspondence referred to ‘lurid 
atrocity stories, which seem to difficult to believe in this exaggerated form’.  Labour Party files reveal 
that Labour Party officials were more exercised by the fact that the visit had been sponsored by the 
Women’s International Democratic Federation than by what was reported:   Labour 
Party/GS/PROS/53-54.  WIDF was a Labour Party proscribed organisation. 
31 The dismissal was well covered in the press on the following day:   Manchester Guardian, Daily 
Herald, 13 June 1951. 
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In announcing his decision to the House on 13 June 1951, Dalton was extremely 
circumspect, very careful to avoid any suggestion that Felton’s sacking was politically 
motivated.32   The reason for her dismissal was as previously set out in his letter of 12 
June, namely Mrs Felton’s failure to attend a meeting of the Public Accounts 
Committee on 7 June to answer questions about the Corporation, a meeting for which 
Felton concedes she was four hours late because of travel delays.33  The failure of a 
witness to attend the proceedings of the Committee except for reasons of ill-health 
was said by Dalton to be ‘unprecedented’, and a ‘discourtesy to [the] House’.   
According to Dalton, ‘it was Mrs. Felton's duty to subordinate all other arrangements, 
whether public or private, whether at home or abroad, to this summons from the 
Public Accounts Committee’, and it was for ‘neglect of duty’ that she was dismissed, 
being ‘unfit to continue to hold the post’ from which she had been relieved.34    
 
Although Felton claimed that she was not dismissed immediately but only four days 
after her return and only after she had said ‘the things I had come back to London to 
say’,35   Dalton repudiated any suggestion that Felton’s remarks had played any part 
in her dismissal:    
 
my departmental duty is to secure the efficient administration of new towns.   
From that point of view it is a matter of total indifference to me whether Mrs. 
Felton was absent in Hollywood or the Riviera or anywhere else.    
 
With Dalton also emphasising that ‘she was absent, and neglected her functions’,36  it 
was left to (Shadow Foreign Secretary) Anthony Eden of all people to tell the minister 
that it would be ‘hard for many of us to believe that the reasons were limited to the 
answer which he has given’.   In this he was joined by Gilbert McAllister, the Labour 
MP for Rutherglen, who challenged Dalton about ‘one of the gravest attacks on civil 
liberties that we have seen’.37 
   
This decisive and peremptory action was no doubt intended to protect Dalton from 
parliamentary criticism that he was harbouring a traitor, despite his denials about his 
motives.38   If so, it backfired spectacularly.   A Tory backbencher raised a lovely 
point of order, to the effect that the proceedings of Select Committees are privileged 
until reported to the House.  To the apparent rage of Dalton,39 the Speaker agreed that 
‘proceedings that are not reported to the House are not to be mentioned’.40   Turning 
the tables on the hapless Minister, Earl Winterton claimed that ‘that there is no 
previous instance of a Minister announcing to the House an action which has taken 
place in Select Committee’.41  The Speaker was thus formally requested to consider 
                                                 
32 HC Debs, 13 June 1951, col 2308. 
33 M Felton, That’s Why I Went (1953), p 162. 
34 HC Debs, 13 June 1951, col 2309. 
35 Felton, That’s Why I Went, above, p 162. 
36 HC Debs, 13 June 1951, col 2309. 
37 Ibid, col 2311. 
38 Even the Daily Mail seemed the ‘utmost speed’ of the proceedings to be significant:  Daily Mail, 14 
June 1951. 
39 On which see especially Daily Telegraph, 14 June 1951.   Dalton’s announcement was widely 
covered in the press. 
40 HC Debs, 13 June 1951, col 2311. 
41 Ibid, col 2312. 
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whether ‘the proceedings of a Select Committee could not be disclosed in this House 
without the permission of the Chairman of the Select Committee; in other words, 
without a statement to the House by the Chairman of the Select Committee’.42 
 
 
IV ALLEGATIONS OF TREASON  
 
Dismissal was the least of Felton’s worries, with some Tory MPs also demanding that 
she be executed.43    As in case of Alan Winnington, Felton’s visit led to allegations of 
treason being made against her, and to demands for her prosecution.  These demands - 
especially chilling, given that a conviction carried the death penalty – were to be 
heard in the Commons, first in an Adjournment Debate, the tormentor in chief being 
Charles Taylor, the Tory MP for Eastbourne.   Subsequently knighted, the Cambridge 
educated Taylor left little of note, his chief distinction being that he was elected for 
the first time in 1935 at a young age, and that he was married to an actress, Constance 
Shotter.44   Nevertheless, at 11.29 pm on 14 June 1951 Taylor rose to make some very 
grave allegations, having originally proposed to devote the occasion to  matters 
relating to gas and electricity boards.45 
 
After recounting some of the detail referred to above, and reading a long extract from 
Felton’s Moscow radio address, Taylor also referred to a Press Association report of a 
recent meeting at Holborn:  
 
‘Women wept as they listened to Dr. Monica Felton at Holborn Hall last 
night’. She said: ‘We as British people are ashamed that Britain should have 
played any part at all in the Korea situation’.  She said that men and women in 
Northern Korea had been machine gunned as they worked in the fields. She 
said: ‘In areas occupied by Americans, persons had been killed and burnt and 
buried alive’.  She said that hospitals had been bombed despite Red Cross 
markings, and that tortures had been inflicted upon innocent people.46 
 
Taylor conceded that he was not ‘trying this woman in the House of Commons this 
evening’.   But he nevertheless submitted that there was a ‘very strong case here to 
say that she has been guilty of high treason’, with a number of Members showing 
their appreciation in the normal way.47 
 
Although there was no evidence that Taylor was a lawyer, the nub of the case against 
Felton was the Treason Act 1351, by which it was an offence to give aid or comfort to 
the King’s enemies, in the realm or elsewhere.  According to Taylor, Mrs Felton's 
‘widely-publicised broadcast from Moscow, incidentally heard in this country by an 
hon Member, has given aid and comfort to the King's enemies’.   Anticipating the 
argument that the United Kingdom was not officially at war with North Korea, Taylor 
found support in Archbold’s Criminal Pleading and Practice for the view that ‘the 
word ‘enemies’ includes the subjects of States in actual hostility with us whether war 
                                                 
42 Ibid.    
43 Daily Herald, 15 June 1951. 
44 Daily Telegraph, 2 January 2013 (Obituary of Barbara Shotter, actress). 
45 HC Debs, 14 June 1950, col 2676. 
46 Ibid, col 2678. 
47 Ibid. 
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has been solemnly proclaimed or not’.   As Taylor made clear, this was not publicity 
seeking on his part.   Addressing the Attorney General directly, he asked  
 
if, on the evidence which has been submitted to him, he is prepared to institute 
proceedings against this woman for treason so that the case may be fully 
examined in the British courts of justice. If in those courts she is found to be 
innocent she will be set free, but if, on the other hand, she is found to be guilty 
she must pay the penalty.48 
 
There were no murmurs of approval at this stage in the proceedings.   Nor when 
Taylor insisted that ‘we have got to show these people that, if they are failing in their 
allegiance to their King and country, and if they are prepared to give encouragement 
and comfort to, and to consort with, the King's enemies, then the most drastic action 
will be taken against them’.49   At this point, however, the Attorney General (now Sir 
Frank Soskice) intervened dramatically to turn up the heat, rising to say that the 
papers on the case had been referred to the DPP.50   This had the immediate effect of 
killing any further discussion about the law and any possible illegality on Felton’s 
part.  But it would hardly give her any cause for comfort, particularly as she claims to 
have considered but discounted the threat of treason while in Moscow.51   Nor would 
she have taken any comfort from the following day’s front page splash in the Daily 
Herald announcing ‘Mrs Felton:  Papers for Police’, and ‘Treason Allegation Causes 
Commons Sensation’.52 
 
The matter was raised a few days later by Nigel Fisher, the Eton and Cambridge 
educated Tory MP for Hitchin, said to have been on the liberal side of the Tory 
party.53  But Soskice was again able to parry the question on the ground that he was 
still waiting for the DPP to report.54   That, however, was an invitation for another line 
of questioning about why Felton was allowed to travel to Korea on a British passport, 
an important question as it turns out in view of the extreme proposals then circulating 
in government about whether the power should be taken to prohibit people from 
leaving the country or to restrict the destinations to which they may travel.  Directing 
these questions to Kenneth Younger (Minister of State at the Foreign Office), Fisher 
asked whether ‘a passport endorsement should be required for a British subject to 
travel to visit an enemy State with whom we are actually engaged in war?’.   
According to Younger, however, there was no need to do that, because her passport 
‘was not made valid for that’.55   
 
This rather curious response was never likely to put an end to proposals for travel 
bans being developed further, demands fuelled by various high level defections to the 
Soviet Union.  In the meantime, Felton was left to sweat on the treason point for 
another 10 days, with three questions now on the Order paper waiting for a reply.  
                                                 
48 Ibid, col 2679. 
49 Ibid. 
50 Ibid, col 2680. 
51 M Felton, That’s Why I Went, above, p 165. 
52 Daily Herald, 15 June 1951. 
53 Independent, 10 October 1996 (Obituary). 
54 HC Debs, 18 June 1950, col 1. 
55 Ibid, col 3. 
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After consulting both the Prime Minister and Cabinet about how best to respond,56 the 
Attorney General informed the House on 25 June 1951 that - 
 
The advice which I have received from the Director of Public Prosecutions 
and from Treasury Counsel, whose opinion was taken on my instructions, is 
that there is at present insufficient evidence to found any criminal charge 
against Mrs. Felton. I agree with this advice, and accordingly do not intend to 
direct the institution of criminal proceedings against her.57 
 
That was hardly a surprise:   as the (same) DPP was to confirm four years later on the 
same facts, there was no prospect of a treason conviction.58   The reference to the DPP 
bears all the hallmarks of a political stunt by Soskice, perhaps to deflect responsibility 
for inaction to the DPP in the face of strong Tory pressure for a prosecution.   But like 
the Winnington case a few months earlier, the decision was not based on a robust 
defence of Mrs Felton’s freedom of speech, but on the lack of evidence such as to 
justify proceedings against her. And although there was to be no prosecution on this 
occasion, this was nevertheless a fresh reminder of the continuing dangers faced by 
those who travelled to and reported on events in North Korea. 
 
 
V JACK GASTER  
 
Just as Winnington had provoked proposals to restore wartime restrictions on free 
speech, so Felton had provoked proposals to introduce travel bans.   But like the 
former, the latter came to nought and Felton was thus free to make another visit to 
Korea, though little is known about it beyond the fact that she met with British 
prisoners of war.59   There was no repeat of the publicity surrounding her first visit.  
Felton’s second visit was, however, greatly overshadowed by that made by Jack 
Gaster, the London solicitor.   Initially a member of the Independent Labour Party, 
Gaster joined the Communist Party along with many others in 1935.60   According to 
his Security Service file, Gaster became a London District Officer of the Party, and 
was prominent as an anti-fascist speaker and author.61   He served in the army 
between 1942 and 1945, and was discharged to work on the Communist party’s 
election campaign in 1945.  
 
Following the general election in 1945, Gaster was employed in the Parliamentary 
Department at King Street (Communist Party HQ), and worked closely with William 
Gallacher and Phil Piratin, his intercepted phone calls with the latter revealing a 
sometimes difficult relationship between the two Communist Party MPs.   In 1946, 
Gaster was elected to the London County Council, served on the National Appeals 
Committee of the Communist Party, and acted as Secretary of the Communist Party 
Lawyers’ Group.   Inevitably, Gaster was as a result the subject of routine MI5 
                                                 
56 See TNA, CAB 129/46 (Mrs Felton:  Memorandum by the Attorney General); TNA, CAB 128/19/45 
(Cabinet Conclusions, 21 June 1951). 
57 HC Debs 25 June 1951, col 109-10 WA.  
58 TNA, DPP 2/2425 (FELTON, Monica: Communist Activities in Korea. No action). 
59 A Conference of Privy Councillors had recommended against any such legislation on the ground that 
the powers in the Official Secrets Acts 1911-1940 were sufficient, and would otherwise be pointless:   
Statement on the Findings of Privy Councillors on Security, Cmd 9715, 1956, paras 71 – 73. 
60 For a fuller account, see Guardian, 13 March 2007 (Victoria Brittain). 
61 TNA, KV 2/1558 et seq.  
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surveillance in the sense that references to him in the surveillance of others would be 
added to his file.  Thus, telephone conversations to him at King Street - and from him 
to King Street - are picked up by the telephone check on the Communist Party; 
meetings in which he participated at King Street are picked up by the listening device 
and transcribed; and public meetings he attended and demonstrations he organised are 
written up in Special Branch Reports.    
 
Political advice given to Phil Piratin MP is recorded, legal advice given to various 
people who consulted him about various matters is retained, as is information about 
his private life, such as details of the lease of a flat to an employee of Soviet Weekly 
who was also the subject of surveillance, and who indeed appears to have been 
‘interviewed’ by the Security Service.   To all of this is added any relevant 
information already in the public domain, such as Gaster’s nomination of 
parliamentary candidates, his defeat in LCC elections (1952), and newspaper reports 
about him or referring to him.  Surveillance became more intense, however, when in 
1952 Gaster took part in an investigation into the use by the Americans of germ 
warfare during the Korean war, as a members of a commission established by the 
International Association of Democratic Lawyers (IADL) (denounced by the British 
government as ‘another international Communist ‘front’ organisation’),    
 
As part of the intensification of surveillance, a Foreign Office minute of 24 March 
1952 (addressed we presume to the Security Service) requested a ‘little background 
information’ about Gaster (who was joined in this mission by representatives from a 
number of other countries), to be given to the Charge d’Affaires at Peking ‘for his 
own guidance’.62   The author of the minute then asked whether there was anything 
that the Charge d’Affaires at Peking could say publicly there to discredit Gaster.   A 
short note was duly provided as requested, making clear that it was general 
knowledge that Gaster was an ‘active communist’, on many occasions making public 
speeches on behalf of the party.63   A little extra colour from the files was nevertheless 
provided, though there is no mention of anything new that could be said to discredit 
Gaster, the note struggling to find anything notable that was not already in the public 
domain.   Gaster was a man who lived his life in public, with nothing to be found by 
MI5.    
 
As might be expected, Gaster was nevertheless very closely monitored while a 
member of the Commission.   A Security Service report records that he left the United 
Kingdom on 9 February 1952, arriving in Korea on 1 March.64    Following his arrival 
in Korea, Gaster sent a telegram to D N Pritt KC (the President of IADL), the 
contents of the telegram being reported in the Daily Worker on 19 March.65  This was 
said to confirm that the Americans had been engaged in germ warfare.  Two days 
later Moscow Radio broadcast excerpts from an address by Gaster to representatives 
of the Korean Republic.  Thereafter, Gaster was reported by Soviet Weekly to have 
told a reception in Peking on 22 March that 
 
                                                 
62 TNA, KV 2/1559 (Copy of FO Minute from L M Minford to B1). 
63 TNA, KV 2/1559 (K Morton Evan to Minford, 27 March 1952). 
64 TNA, DPP 2/2424 (Security Service Report on Mr Jack Gaster). 
65 Pritt was himself the subject of intense surveillance for a long period:  TNA, KV 2/1062 – 1065 
(1931 – 1952). 
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I have seen in Korea enough of horror and brutality and savagery for a life-
time.  But to see is not enough.  For unless civilised peoples of the whole 
world raise up and stay the hands of the criminals, the horror and savagery 
will spread.  Korea is not an incident.   It is part of a world-wide plan of 
dangerous madmen.66 
 
This was duly followed by a message in the Communist Party London District 
Bulletin on 4 April while Gaster was still overseas, in which he claimed that the 
Americans were distributing ‘germ-laden insects in Korea’.67  On their return, the 
IADL Commission presented their report to the IADL Council in Vienna on 16 April, 
at a meeting chaired by Pritt.   A detailed account of their findings was presented to 
the press at about the same time, closely watched by British and no doubt other 
security services.   So far as the British government was concerned, this was nothing 
more than an international endeavour to support the Soviet Union, with newspapers 
reporting that panel members had been unable to answer basic questions, and the 
IADL chairman embarrassed that photographs supporting various claims had been 
supplied by Chinese scientists, the integrity of whom these newspapers and agencies 
appeared to question.68 
 
 
VI ALLEGATIONS OF TREASON  
 
Returning to London a few days later, Gaster called a press conference to present a 
38-page indictment of US war crimes.  Reported by the Daily Worker on 23 April, 
this was said to refer to ‘germ warfare, shooting without trial, burning alive, torture 
and organised destruction’.69  In the meantime, however, MI5 were to learn that on 30 
April 1952 a meeting of the Haldane Society took place at which it appears Gaster’s 
claims met with some scepticism from what ought to have been a sympathetic 
audience.70   The sceptic in chief was Harvey Moore QC who had declined an 
invitation to sit on the IADL Commission because of the vagueness of its terms of 
reference, doubts about its funding, and the uncertainty about to whom the 
Commission was responsible.   Moore also raised the question about how the 
Commission could be sure that it was not the Koreans or the Chinese who had spread 
the germs. 
 
According to MI5, which had a lawyer very deeply embedded in the Haldane Society, 
the best Gaster could say was that on a balance of probabilities, it was the Americans 
that were responsible.71  This seemed to satisfy the great bulk of those present at the 
                                                 
66 Soviet Weekly, 3 April 1952 
67 London District Bulletin, ‘America’s Germ Warfare’, 4 April 1952 (extract in TNA, DPP 2/2424 
(Jack Gaster:  Communist Activities in Korea)). 
68 TNA, DPP 2/22/24 (Copy of Foreign Office INTEL 106, 24 April 1952). 
69 Ibid.   Gaster’s articles in the Daily Worker  were then republished as a pamphlet also entitled Korea 
– I Saw the Truth.   
70 TNA, DPP 2/2424 (Security Service Report on Mr Jack Gaster). 
71 The US has always denied the claims about germ warfare, though the vehemence of the denials has 
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meeting, with 490 voting to support the motion that Gaster had made a strong prima 
facie case (exactly about what is not clear), Moore abstaining along with a handful of 
others.   But Moore was not the only critic, Gaster’s activities leading more 
ominously elsewhere to predictable Tory demands for his prosecution, in relation to 
the ‘publication of a seditious pamphlet, circulating in this country through a Mr Jack 
Gaster’, sent by IADL ‘to consort with the enemy in North Korea and North-East 
China’.72  The Attorney General – by now Sir Reginald Manningham Buller QC 
(subsequently Viscount Dilhorne, Lord Chancellor) - wisely thought that no criminal 
proceedings were called for, though significantly the demand at this stage was not for 
a treason prosecution as had been the case in relation to Alan Winnington and Monica 
Felton under the previous government. 
 
The Gaster case was, however, to land on Manningham Buller’s desk on at least two 
subsequent occasions when the treason question was raised again,   The first of these 
was for remarks made at a meeting of the Haldane Society of Socialist Lawyers a few 
years later, no doubt informed by what he had seen in 1952.   Here we find the Tory 
backbencher Cyril Black writing to the Attorney in 1955 about a constituent who 
would prefer ‘if possible not to have his identity revealed’.73  The constituent in 
question, said to be ‘a strong anti-communist’, had attended a Haldane meeting at 
which Gaster is alleged to have made a speech of ‘treasonable character’ about the 
Korean conflict.   The matter was taken sufficiently seriously to again involve the 
DPP, who advised that it would be very difficult to establish that anything said at a 
Haldane Society meeting was treasonable, but suggesting also that it would do no 
harm to interview the informant ‘since he is apparently prepared to supply 
information on request’.74. 
 
Unusually, the brief exchange of correspondence between Black, Manningham-
Buller, the DPP and officials revealed the identity of the informant, the MI5 censor 
apparently not consulted when this file was opened in December 2007.  On 22 March 
1955, Black wrote to Manningham-Buller in the following terms 
 
I have been in communication with my constituent who has authorized me to 
disclose his name.   He is Mr A F H Lindner, Solicitor, practising at 17, Soho 
Square, W1, whose private address is 2, Ridgeway Gardens, Wimbledon, SW 
19. 
 
Mr Lindner tells me that he has not retained his notes that he took of various 
statements made at meetings of the Haldane Society which he attended, but, 
following each meeting, he sent a full report to the Special Branch as to the 
statements made which he regarded as being of a treasonable character.   You 
can presumably obtain access to these reports sent by Mr Lindner to the 
Special Branch.  Mr Lindner would be available for interview if desired.75 
 
We know nothing about Mr Lindner, but note that an A F H Lindner had been an 
unsuccessful Labour candidate at the 1945 general election.  We do not know at this 
                                                 
72 HC Debs, 21 July 1952, col 4. 
73 TNA, LO 02/227 
74 TNA, LO 02/227 
75 TNA, LO 02/227.   On the significance of the ‘outing’ of Lindner, see K D Ewing, J Mahoney and A 
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stage whether they are the same person.   We have no idea whether Mr Lindner 
provided other information, or who were the other ‘sources’.  Apart from the fact that 
MI5 cannot be trusted to guarantee the anonymity of sources forever, it is 
nevertheless thus clear that the Tory treason campaign was being pursued both 
publicly and privately.   
 
The DPP’s advice about the implausibility of a treason prosecution was reinforced 
later that year when, following the re-opening of the Korean War scars for the reasons 
described below, Manningham-Buller referred to him for re-consideration the position 
of all four of the British ‘subversives’, including Gaster.   To help the Director 
consider this question, he was conveniently sent a five page memorandum from MI5 
containing information drawn from Gaster’s MI5 file,76 as well as the details of the 
IADL report.77   In considering liability for treason, the DPP drew attention to its 
scope as well as the capital nature of the offence, but also pointed out that even during 
the Second World War treason was resorted to on only four occasions, the 
government preferring instead to rely on by now repealed statutory emergency powers 
which included a much more flexible approach to sentencing and punishment.   But in 
swiftly dispatching any suggestion that treason would be appropriate in the Korean 
war cases, the DPP said (directly contradicting the advice given to the Attlee Cabinet 
by Shawcross with the support of Viscount Jowitt (Lord Chancellor)): 
But even assuming, which in my view is doubtful, that the North Koreans and 
the Chinese were enemies within the meaning of the Treason Act, the conduct 
of these persons, though undoubtedly reprehensible, could scarcely be said to 
merit death.78 
It did not follow from this, however, that the legal position as it then stood was 
satisfactory, the DPP noting that in times of war it was relatively easy for 
governments to get emergency powers to deal with those engaged in subversive 
activities.  But as he pointed out, it was much more difficult to get such powers when 
British troops were engaged in hostilities overseas, as in the cases of Korea and 
Malaysia, which was then also germane.  In these circumstances, the Director advised 
that permanent legislation based on war time powers should be introduced to make it 
an offence for anyone ‘with intent to assist any enemies against whom Her Majesty in 
engaged in hostilities, any person does any act which is likely to assist any such 
enemies, he shall, without prejudice to the law of treason, on conviction on 
indictment, be liable to imprisonment for fourteen years’.79  This echoed proposals 
referred to above that had been under active consideration by the Attlee government, 
having been torpedoed first by the Cabinet Secretary, and then by the general election 
in 1951.80  No legislation was introduced, though the matter appears to have been 
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77 See TNA, DPP 2/2424 (GASTER, Jack:  Communist Activities in Korea. No action).   See also 
TNA, DPP 2/2423 (SHAPIRO, Michael:  Communist Activities in Korea. No action), and TNA, DPP 
2/2425 (FELTON, Monica: Communist Activities in Korea. No action).  There is no corresponding file 
for Winnington, but there was no basis for a prosecution. 
78 TNA, DPP 2/2424 (GASTER, Jack:  Communist Activities in Korea. No action) (Subversive 
Activities during Hostilities, Memorandum by the Director of Public Prosecutions, 30 June 1955).   
Compare the views of Shawcross and Jowett, p *** above. 
79 A certificate by a minister would prove conclusively the fact of hostilities, and perhaps also identify 
the enemy in the event of any prosecution. 
80 See also pp *** - *** below. 
 15 
considered further by the government.81   
 
VII THE PRISONERS OF WAR 
 
As we have seen, the Armistice was signed on 24 July 1953, and with it the end of 
what the government considered to be the subversive propaganda.  But quite 
unexpectedly, the Korean issue re-emerged as a serious domestic political issue when 
the question of British POWs was considered by the Cabinet some 16 months later (2 
December 1954).82  The occasion seemed to be US anger about the treatment of its 
POWs by the Chinese during the Korean War.  The Foreign Secretary (Anthony 
Eden) said that he proposed to express his support in the House in a forthcoming 
debate, and that a factual statement would be published about the treatment of British 
military personnel.   Noting these statements, the Cabinet invited the Minister of 
Defence to circulate the latter statement to the Cabinet before publication.   This was 
duly done on 7 December 1954, the Cabinet being presented with the proofs of a 
statement by the Ministry of Defence about the treatment of British prisoners of war 
captured during the Korean campaign.83    
 
The statement was to be the opportunity for the publication of ‘severe, though well 
deserved, strictures on the conduct of a number of visitors, Communist and 
Communist sympathisers, to the prison camps in North Korea at which the British 
prisoners – of war – were held’.84   So although there had not been any treason 
prosecutions, now was the opportunity for some kind of retribution by what was no 
less than an unprecedented and unparalleled public denunciation of Alan Winnington, 
Monica Felton, Jack Gaster, and several others.85   But such a process was fraught 
with legal danger for the government, the immediate question being whether the 
Report would ‘afford ground for libel’.86   To which the answer unequivocally was a 
resounding ‘Yes’.  In a memorandum dated 13 December 1954, the Attorney General 
(writing also on behalf of the Solicitor General) considered chapters 6 and 7 of the 
Ministry of Defence document to contain ‘many defamatory, indeed highly 
defamatory, passages in relation to the individuals named therein’.87    
 
As a result, unless the publication was the subject of absolute privilege, any of the 
named persons could bring libel proceedings against the Crown, with the Attorney 
General being the likely defendant.   So while not doubting that the defamatory 
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statements relating to all four of the British civilians who had visited the POW camps 
were well merited, the Law Officers nevertheless thought it unlikely that the 
publication of such defamatory material to the public at large would be the legally 
protected as being subject of qualified privilege.  Indeed, the Attorney General 
continued by saying that  
 
Having regard to the way in which the draft is written, and the omission to 
name any soldiers who collaborated while naming these civilians, we think it 
likely that it would be held that there was malice in which case a defence 
based on a plea of qualified privilege would fail.88 
 
Not only that.   Concern was also expressed that if a libel action succeeded, the 
damages ‘might be very substantial indeed as the innuendo clearly is that these named 
civilians were guilty of conduct akin to treason’.89 
 
In order to avoid these problems, the Law Officers appeared to suggest that the 
document should be published under cover of the Parliamentary Papers Act 1840.  
The latter provided that legal proceedings (civil or criminal) were to be stayed if (i) 
they arose out of the publication of a document published with the authority of either 
House of Parliament, and (ii) an official of the House in question produced a 
certificate to confirm such authority.90   The Attorney General also pointed out that by 
virtue of s 3 of the 1840 Act, the publication of an extract from the report would be 
similarly protected, provided it was published ‘bona fide and without malice’.  But 
although this would provide legal protection for the government (and it seems 
remarkable that such advice had not already been provided within the Ministry of 
Defence), there were other concerns: 
 
If it is published in this fashion, those named and their fellow travellers may 
complain that publication of highly defamatory libels in a paper so protected is 
really an abuse of Parliamentary procedure and that those named are being 
condemned in the public eye for conduct akin to high treason without a trial and 
without any opportunity of clearing their names and reputations; and those who 
condemn the conduct of these civilians may demand to know whey they have not 
been tried.91 
 
In the light of these concerns, the Law Officers proposed that if the document was 
published with the authority of the House (which they appeared to think was 
inevitable), chapter 6 and 7 should be re-written to reduce the risk of the government 
being accused of abusing parliamentary procedure.  They thus proposed to reduce the 
defamatory content of the chapters without depriving them of their point.   In 
concluding the two-page document, the Law Officers wrote as follows: 
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Could not the line be that the public should be made aware of the use made by the 
Chinese and the North Koreans of visits by civilians to the British prisoner – of – 
war camps, and the consequences of such visits to British prisoners – of – war, 
without suggesting that these named visitors connived in the use to which their 
visits were put and were aware of the consequences to certain British prisoners; 
that they were ignorant idiots rather than traitorous.92 
 
The answer it seems was a just as resounding ‘No’, the legal concerns apparently 
overruled, and the report being published without amendment and without cover of 
parliamentary privilege.   The government it seems was prepared to take the risk and 
to invite the ‘civilians’ to sue, confident in the knowledge that they would not do so.93    
 
The Cabinet Secretary’s Notebook reveals that at the Cabinet meeting on 15 
December the Foreign Secretary rejected Sir Reginald’s suggestion that the material 
be rewritten to avoid the implication of treachery.94  It also reveals that Eden rode the 
criticism of H[arry] C[rookshank] (Lord Privy Seal) that White Papers are usually 
objective, and this one was not.  Eden insisted that the document should be published 
without protection, at which point the Prime Minister no less proposed that the 
Attorney General should be permitted to consider alterations to reduce the risk of 
prosecution.   To which Eden stubbornly replied that they could not do that and the 
government must run the risk of legal proceedings against it.95   But why was it 
necessary to pillory the individuals asked the Marquess of Salisbury (Lord President), 
and why could minor alterations not be made to reduce the risk of proceedings 
repeated the Attorney General?   None of this would damage the central point of the 
paper which was to condemn the Chinese.   But Eden refused to ‘let off’ the English 
communists, and in this he had the support of the Minister of Labour, and ‘K’, who 
appears to have been Lord Kilmuir the celebrated ‘author’ of the ECHR. 
 
 
VIII ALLEGATIONS OF TREASON 
 
In thus publicly denouncing four Britons and one Australian citizen, the White Paper 
also provided an opportunity to revisit the treason allegations.96   Thus, Chapter 6 of 
the White Paper (headed the ‘Role of Visitors’) begins with the claim that until 
recently, independent visitors such as the Red Cross were barred by the Chinese from 
the prison camps in Korea, whereas facilities were readily arranged for visits by 
Communists and Communist sympathisers.   More specifically, it was said that  
 
The Chinese used five British Commonwealth visitors in their cause.  These 
were Mr Alan Winnington of the London Daily Worker; Mr Wilfred Burchett, 
an Australian by birth, who went to China as a correspondent for the Left – 
wing Paris Ce Soir, and later L’Humanite, and then on to Korea; Mr Michael 
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Shapiro, a correspondent of the London Daily Worker, resident in Peking; Mr 
Jack Gastor, a member of the British Communist Party and a London solicitor; 
and Mrs Monica Felton, chairman of the British National Association of 
Women, which is affiliated to the Women’s International Democratic 
Federation, an international Communist ‘front’ organisation.97 
 
Also according to the report, Gaster had visited in 1952 as part of a delegation of the 
International Association of Democratic Lawyers (IADL), dubbed ‘another 
international Communist ‘front’ organisation, which had been invited by the Chinese 
and North Korean governments to investigate allegations of bacteriological warfare 
and atrocities by United Nations troops’.98   Gaster, who made only one visit, was said 
by the government report to have provided ‘glowing accounts of camp conditions’, 
writing that prisoners ‘get more meat, more fats, and more sugar to eat than anyone in 
Britain receives from a ration book’.99    In the case of Mrs Felton, it was said that she 
 
first visited Korea as a member of a delegation from the Women’s 
International Democratic Federation in May 1951, and on her return wrote a 
book called That’s Why I Went.  This purported to show that she was 
originally open-minded but subsequently became convinced, as a result of 
‘proofs’ which she was shown, of wholesale murder, torture and rape carried 
out by the United Nations forces.   She also brought back from Korea with her 
a number of letters from British prisoners.  In 1952, Mrs Felton received a 
Stalin Peace Prize in Moscow whence she again went to China and Korea, and 
visited Camp 5.   There she had the usual conducted tour, collected letters 
from prisoners and talked to, and had a meal with, the usual selected 
‘progressives’.  As one prisoner has said:  ‘Mrs Felton visited the camp and 
took the progressives down to the village, which made her even more 
unpopular with the anti-progressive personnel’.   A talk by her on world peace 
and American aggression was recorded and subsequently played over the 
loudspeaker system of Camp 2 (Branch 1) early in 1953.100 
 
The other three named civilians (to use the language of the Attorney General) were 
not resident in the United Kingdom and came in for more damning criticism.   Daily 
Worker journalist Alan Winnington had ‘produced lurid accounts of germ warfare’, as 
well as ‘harrowing stories of the ‘indiscriminate’ bombing of civilians, descriptions of 
the happy lives supposed to be led by prisoners in the North Korean camps, and of 
massacre, torture and brutality suffered by the Chinese and North Koreans in the 
prison camps controlled by the United Nations’.101    But according to the Ministry of 
Defence, his main role in North Korea was that of visiting propagandist, in which 
capacity he gave lectures on such subjects as the Korean peace talks, the aims of the 
world peace conferences, and the appalling conditions in the United States and 
Britain.   He was said to be welcome in one of the camps but often to be greeted with 
shouts of ‘traitor’ and such like in another.  But he was unpopular with officers, to 
whom it is said he once referred as ‘bloody fascists’.102 
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Finally, reference was made to the role of Michael Shapiro, another Daily Worker 
journalist who it said was used not as a propagandist but as an interrogator, being first 
seen by prisoners in Korea in February 1951 when he individually interrogated and 
interviewed men captured near Seoul in the previous month.   Some of the most 
unpleasant accusations were reserved for Shapiro, in respect of whom it was said that 
 
During the interrogations one sergeant of the Royal `Ulster Rifles, who was 
suffering from dysentery and the early symptoms of beri-beri, from which he later 
died, told Shapiro that he was the ‘poorest example of an Englishman I’ve ever 
seen, and if I could get my fingers round your scrawny neck I’d wring it’.  Shapiro 
retaliated by having him marched out with the comment:   “I’ll have you shot’.   
This remark was perhaps not meant seriously but the early death of the sergeant 
suggest he was given little medical attention.103 
 
At about the same time as these events, Shapiro was said to have lectured a number of 
US prisoners, and to have told them that they were ‘warmongering dogs who deserve 
to die like dogs’, and to have been ‘amused’ to ‘see the prisoners dying fast of 
malnutrition and neglect’.104   Whether any of this would have stood up to scrutiny in 
legal proceedings will never be known, though it is easy to understand why the law 
officers might be nervous about highly prejudicial statements of fact and wild 
speculation informed by evidence of what seemed at best to be uncertain probative 
value. 
 
Following publication of the White Paper, the matter returned to Cabinet on 3 March 
1955, where the Attorney General raised a fresh concern.105  Apparently frustrated by 
the inactive legal position in relation to the four named individuals, a number of 
government supporters were reported by Manningham-Buller as intending to seek 
leave to introduce under the ten-minute rule a Bill of Attainder against the persons 
concerned.  This is a procedure described by Maitland as an Act of Parliament ‘for 
putting a man to death, or otherwise punishing him without any trial at all’.106   In the 
words of Maitland, ‘It is not a judicial act, it proceeds with the legislative authority of 
King, Lords and Commons’,107 emphasizing that punishment is inflicted ‘without any 
judicial formalities’.108   This ‘evil practice’ had last been used to inflict the death 
penalty in 1696, though ‘minor punishments have been inflicted by similar means in 
later days’.109  Little wonder that there should be a frisson of alarm in the Attorney-
General’s report to Cabinet, where it was noted with some understatement that the 
‘consequences of such action were likely to be unfortunate’.110   There was general 
agreement that ‘it was undesirable that the power of attainder should be revived’, and 
Sir Reginald was invited ‘to indicate informally’ to the Government supporters 
concerned that the Government ‘did not favour the promotion of a Bill of Attainder 
under the ten-minute rule’.111  
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The government it seems was content that the individuals in question should be 
publicly denounced without any further formality.   This in itself was an obnoxious 
process for reasons given by Sydney Silverman, addressing the Attorney General 
from the Labour benches in the following terms: 
 
In view of the undesirability of condemning people in advance of proceedings 
and upon anonymous evidence, will the right hon and learned Gentleman say 
what opportunity was given, if any, to the named persons to comment on the 
allegations made against them before their names were used in this publication 
in this way?112 
 
Given that he had himself already raised concerns of this kind privately in his Cabinet 
Memorandum of 13 December,113 Manningham – Buller’s response was at best 
disingenuous.   So far as he was concerned, it was now enough that ‘that there appears 
to have been plenty of opportunity for comment in the columns of the Daily Worker 
since publication’.114   The sense of inadequacy of the response is reinforced by the 
subsequent comment by the Lord Chancellor who, when pressed in the House of 
Lords to distinguish Mrs Felton’s activities from those of Sir Roger Casement,115 
replied that he had been authorised by the Attorney General to say that ‘however 
much one may deplore Mrs Felton's activities, there is no evidence that she tried to 
suborn British prisoners of war’.116   This said Viscount Kilmuir contrasted with 
Casement's case, where ‘there was clear evidence, which Casement himself did not 




IX … BACK TO ALAN WINNINGTON 
The more serious allegations were made against both Winnington and Shapiro, but 
they were both now resident in China, a carefully worded threat of treason 
discouraging any thoughts (however distant) of a speedy return, Manningham-Buller 
having also said in the House of Commons on 7 March 1955 that if either returned 
careful consideration would then be given to the institution of a criminal prosecution 
against them.118   But just to make sure that they did not return – with a view 
implausibly to bring libel proceedings or more plausibly for any other reason – their 
route was blocked by the refusal on the part of the British  government in 1954 to 
renew their passports, which meant that they were free to travel only between 
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Communist countries.119   It is thought that Shapiro never returned to the United 
Kingdom, while Winnington’s passport was not restored for another 14 years.   A 
similar fate befell the fifth man, Wilfred Burchett whose Australian passport was 
restored only by the Whitlam government in 1972. 
But the use of these tactics was not only gratuitous;  it was also malevolent and 
dishonest, as the circumstances surrounding Winnington’s passport were to reveal.    
Winnington tried on several occasions since 1954 to renew his passport, being 
rejected by both Tory and Labour governments.   This is revealed in a series of 
exchanges between Foreign Office officials in 1966, which show that as early as 1963 
Winnington had been told that he would be given an emergency certificate 
(subsequently referred to as an emergency passport) which would authorize a single 
one-way journey only.  Although there was no plan to prosecute him were he to return 
to the United Kingdom,120 no guarantees could be given that a prosecution would not 
take place.  It is thus hardly surprising that neither Winnington nor the Daily 
Worker/Morning Star should find this attractive, officials continuing to justify the 
refusal of more meaningful assurances on the specious but convenient ground that 
Winnington may have committed treason.121   
It was thus not until 1968 that Winnington eventually succeeded in having his 
passport restored, after a long battle fought politically, and in the press.122    Even The 
Times thought that ‘to withhold [Winnington’s] passport for 14 years by an arbitrary 
administrative decision, and to refuse even now to reconsider that decision, is 
intolerably unjust’.123   But it was a letter to the editor of the Times (when such 
communications carried more weight than they do today) that revealed the real nature 
of the injustice, the author of the letter being George Matthews, who was himself the 
editor of the Morning Star.124   Matthews exposed the lie, pointing out that in 1954 
the Attorney General had told the Commons that he had no evidence that Winnington 
had been part of the interrogation of British POWs.   Yet only a few months later a 
Foreign Office minister had written to a Labour MP to say that Winnington’s passport 
had been refused because he had been involved in these interrogations.125    
Little wonder that Matthews should also take issue with Eden’s vague and 
unsubstantiated charge in 1954 that Winnington was engaged in conduct ‘prejudicial 
to the national interest’ such as to justify the withholding of his passport.126   As 
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Matthews pointed out: 
We consider that far from being ‘prejudicial to the national interest’ Mr 
Winnington’s activities were of great value in throwing light on aspects of the 
Korean war which the British people were fully entitled to be informed about.  
He was doing his duty as a journalist, and it is outrageous that because of this 
a spiteful action was taken against him which for 14 years has made it difficult 
for him to function fully and effectively as a correspondent of this 
newspaper.127 
But although it appears that a decision had been justified on false evidence, a failure 
compounded by the fact that a member of Parliament had been misled by a minister, 
the original decision was upheld by successive Foreign Secretaries, with the principal 
reason for denying a passport as late as 1966 being a concern that Winnington’s 
return to the United Kingdom ‘might lead to political embarrassment’.128 
The injustice of the position was set out not only by the editors of the Morning Star 
and the Times, but also by John Beith, the Foreign Secretary’s Private Secretary, who 
wrote that the main reason for restoring the passport was that ‘the arbitrary removal of 
passports without trial, conviction or indeed any process of review is a procedure 
much resented in the country’.129   According to Beith (in what is a clear 
acknowledgement that Winnington was being punished by the government for his 
activity in Korea), most people would consider that Winnington had paid his score by 
14 years incommunicado and that it would be a reasonable act of clemency to renew 
the passport.130  Further evidence that the passport was being used as an instrument of 
punishment for reporting inconvenient truths is to be found in an internal minute in 
which it was claimed that there was ‘ample justification’ for non renewal on account 
of the behaviour set out in the White Paper above,131 ‘despite the fact that insufficient 
evidence to prosecute Mr Winnington in a court of law has ever been found’.132  
It is nevertheless unclear whether considerations of principle were as decisive as 
cynical acts of political calculation in the restoration of the passport.  Here the 
government was plagued by three anxieties:  the campaign in the press, the fact that 
an MP had been given false information in 1954 to justify the original decision, and a 
parliamentary campaign being led by Tom Driberg MP.   But lurking behind all of 
this was a fear of US reaction, for although there was no evidence that Winnington 
was involved in the interrogation of British POWs, there was said to be unspecified 
evidence that he had been involved in the interrogation of US POWs.133  This was laid 
bare in an official minute to Beith, in which it was recorded that Driberg’s campaign 
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was likely to lead to a reference to the newly established Parliamentary Commissioner 
for Administration,134 and with it an outcome unfavourable to the government in light 
of the evidence.   Better then to slip this out quietly without alerting the Americans, 
than after a PCA investigation which ‘would be likely to receive more publicity in the 
United States than would the restoration of facilities without his intervention’.135 
 
X   CONCLUSION 
In striking parallels with the Blair government elected in 1997, Attlee’s general 
election manifesto commitment in 1945 to restore civil liberties was quickly to wear 
thin,136 the government provoked beyond endurance by reports about what the United 
Nations forces were alleged to be doing in Korea.  Unlike Blair’s response to 
international terrorism, however, Attlee was unable to follow through with legislation, 
though this had been contemplated.  The type of legislation that the DPP suggested 
above had previously been advocated by Chuter Ede (Home Secretary), to ‘close 
some of the gaps in the existing law’,137 so that it should be an offence where an 
individual 
 
systematically publishes false or misleading matter in any newspapers, 
leaflets, periodicals or other documents with a view to influencing public 
opinion (whether in the United Kingdom or elsewhere) in a manner likely to 
be prejudicial to the carrying out by His Majesty’s forces or by the forces of 
an associated Power of any operations outside the United Kingdom involving 
the use of force.138 
But even if the government had been able to enact measures of this kind, in the 
context of the Korean war it may not have been of much assistance in light of the 
admission by Sir Norman Brook (Cabinet Secretary) privately that Winnington was 
telling the truth.139 
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The parallels do not end there.   What the experience of Winnington, Felton and 
Gaster expose is the importance of the administrative power of the state to threaten, 
intimidate and punish.   That power could hardly be greater than in the use of treason 
as a weapon, given the consequences of a conviction and the reliance of the convicted 
person on the mercy of a Home Secretary, whose decision would be swayed by the 
same political calculations that moved the frankly unimpressive Attorneys General 
encountered above.    In relation to Korea all three Attorneys General allowed 
themselves to be guided by political calculation, losing any sense of their 
responsibility to provide independent legal advice to the government.140   Playing to a 
gallery of fully aroused Tory back-benchers, all three were to make ill-judged and ill-
informed claims about treason, which were privately repudiated by the DPP, while 
also making politically motivated threats about prosecutions which could never be 
brought.   
The use of law to threaten, intimidate and punish without resorting to prosecution is a 
power rarely acknowledged.   This is not to suggest that if the contemporary 
instability in Korea were to lead to conflict that we would see renewed attempts to use 
treason in the same way to silence those who reported on any such conflict, the 
number of journalists and activists doing so likely to be much greater today, and their 
criticism much more intense than in 1950-1953.141   Indeed, it is likely that we have 
seen the last of treason being deployed in this way, hopefully not only because 
governments have many other powers at their disposal than were available in the 
1950s.   That said, there is no reason to believe that the protection of freedom of 
expression now by statute (Human Rights Act 1998) rather than then by the common 
law will offer any better protection from the administrative harassment of dissidents 
that we encountered in the Korean conflict, even if it may offer some opportunity for 
redress.142 
In essence, however, the foregoing is an extreme example of a method of State 
behaviour which undermines civil liberties casually and informally, which has been 
repeated on various occasions ever since, when insiders, journalists and others have 
exposed malpractice.   These are administrative powers which involve harassment of 
various kinds, using the authority of the State improperly and opportunistically as an 
instrument of intimidation.   (We do not include here harassment and worse that has 
no legal authority and which for all practical purposes is also designed to silence 
critics of different kinds.)   But from Korea to the Iraq war - and now Syria - we can 
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see many examples of the State’s taste for casual and informal interventions (albeit 
rooted in some kind of legal authority) rather than the use of legal proceedings to 
crush opponents.143   If in 65 years time legal historians are looking back to find 
parallels for what we discuss above, they may well point to Kathryn Gun, David 
Kelly and Andrew Gilligan as examples.144 
This is not to say that the claims against all the latter were as brutal or as serious as 
the claims against Winnington, Felton and Gaster.  But they were no less public and 
no less devastating (especially in Kelly’s case)145 – and no more justified.    Nor is 
this to say that the administrative power of the State is always if ever successful in 
restraining speech.   Despite intimidation of the most appalling kind, Winnington, 
Felton and Gaster have left a body of work that is now of great contemporary 
significance, and it is work to which we may be encouraged to return if we are fully to 
understand the modern crisis in Korea.   Those who need to read this work most 
urgently, however, are the ministers and officials in the government departments that 
so aggressively abused legal authority, unsuccessfully to deny the British people 
information about the full scale of the atrocities alleged to have been committed in 
their name. 
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